

LTL Model Checking

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Model Checking for LTL

- ▶ Reduction of LTL model checking to CTL model checking with fairness constraints
- ▶ *Symbolic* LTL model checking algorithm
- ▶ Extension of SMV to permit LTL specifications
- ▶ O. Lichtenstein and A. Pnueli. Checking that finite state concurrent programs satisfy their linear specification. In *Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages*, January 1985.
- ▶ E.M. Clarke, O. Grumberg and K. Hamaguchi. Another Look at LTL model checking. In *Proceedings of the 1994 Conference on Computer-Aided Verification*, June 1994.

Motivation


- ▶ Succinct and intuitive descriptions
 - ▶ No path quantifiers
 - ▶ Paths rather than trees
- ▶ Expressiveness
 - ▶ Some properties such as **FG** p cannot be expressed in CTL.

Review of LTL Syntax

Syntax

- ▶ LTL formula:
A f (f is a path formula).
- ▶ Path formulas:
 - ▶ Propositional operators: $\neg p$ and $p \vee q$
 - ▶ Temporal operators: **X** p and $p \mathbf{U} q$

Basic Idea for Reduction



Major Steps in Reduction

- Translate the given LTL formula $A f$ to:
 - Tableau (Kripke structure) $T = (S_T, R_T, L_T)$: Includes every path that satisfies $\neg f$.
 - Fairness constraints \mathcal{F} : Guarantee that every eventuality $g U h$ is ultimately fulfilled.
 - CTL formula ψ : Guarantees that no state is the start of a path that satisfies $\neg f$.
- Generate the Product P of M and T
- Perform CTL model checking of ψ in P under \mathcal{F} .

States of Tableau

S_T is $\mathcal{P}(el(p))$, i.e., the power set of elementary formulas of f .

- $el(p) = \{p\}$ if $p \in AP$.
- $el(\neg g) = el(g)$.
- $el(g \vee h) = el(g) \cup el(h)$.
- $el(\mathbf{X}g) = \{\mathbf{X}g\} \cup el(g)$.
- $el(g \mathbf{U} h) = \{\mathbf{X}(g \mathbf{U} h)\} \cup el(g) \cup el(h)$.


Example.

$$el(a \mathbf{U} b) = \{a, b, \mathbf{X}(a \mathbf{U} b)\}$$

$$el(a \mathbf{U}(\mathbf{X}b)) = \{a, b, \mathbf{X}b, \mathbf{X}(a \mathbf{U}(\mathbf{X}b))\}$$

Simple Example

States in tableau T for $g = a \mathbf{U} b$:



Transition Relation for Tableau

Additional function sat :

$sat(g)$ will be the set of states that satisfy g .


- ▶ $sat(g) = \{\sigma \mid g \in \sigma\}$ where $g \in el(f)$.
- ▶ $sat(\neg g) = \{\sigma \mid \sigma \notin sat(g)\}$.
- ▶ $sat(g \vee h) = sat(g) \cup sat(h)$.
- ▶ $sat(g \mathbf{U} h) = sat(h) \cup (sat(g) \cap sat(\mathbf{X}(g \mathbf{U} h)))$.

Transition relation R_T :

$$R_T(\sigma, \sigma') = \bigwedge_{\mathbf{X}g \in el(f)} \sigma \in sat(\mathbf{X}g) \Leftrightarrow \sigma' \in sat(g).$$

Simple Example (Cont.)

Tableau T for $g = a \mathbf{U} b$:



Fairness Constraints for Reduction

We must guarantee that every eventuality is actually fulfilled. For this purpose we use the following fairness constraints.

Fairness Constraints \mathcal{F} :

$$\{sat(\neg(g \mathbf{U} h) \vee h) \mid g \mathbf{U} h \text{ occurs in } f\}.$$

Correctness of Reduction

Theorem: If $M, \pi' \models \neg f$ for some M and π' , then there exists a path π in T such that:

- ▶ π is a fair path.
- ▶ The initial state of π is in $sat(\neg f)$.

Theorem: $M, \sigma' \models \mathbf{A} f$ if and only if there is NO state (σ, σ') in P such that:


- ▶ $P, (\sigma, \sigma') \models \mathbf{E} g$ true under the fairness constraints.
- ▶ $(\sigma, \sigma') \in sat(\neg f)$.

Sufficient to check the CTL formula ψ :

$$\neg(\mathbf{E} g \text{ true} \ \& \ \mathbf{Sat}_{\neg f})$$


Simple Example (Cont.)

The Kripke structure M :




Simple Example (Cont.)

Product P of the structure M and the tableau T :



Simple Example (Cont.)

The Kripke structure M :



Simple Example (Cont.)

- ▶ Fairness Constraint \mathcal{F} : $aU b$ is eventually fulfilled.
- ▶ CTL formula ψ :

$$\neg(\mathbf{E}g \text{ true} \ \& \ \mathbf{S}at_{\neg(aU b)})$$

LTL Model Checking for SMV

A translator has been developed that extends SMV to permit LTL specifications.

The translator replaces a given LTL formula with SMV code for

- ▶ a tableau,
- ▶ fairness constraints and
- ▶ a CTL formula.

The tableau description is implicit !!

Simple Example (Cont.)

```

MODULE main -- simple program
VAR
  a: boolean;
  b: boolean;

TRANS ( a & !b) -> next(! (a & !b))
TRANS ( a & b) -> next(a & !b)
TRANS (!a & b) -> next(!a & b)
TRANS (!a & !b) -> next(!a & b)

SPEC A[a U b]

```

Translation

```

-- Kripke structure
MODULE
  :
MODULE main
  :
  :

-- LTL formula
SPEC A f

An SMV program

```

Translation

```

-- Kripke structure
MODULE
  :
MODULE main
  :
  :

-- Tableau for f
VAR
  -- new variables
  ELXf : boolean;
  :
  :
  ELXg : boolean;
  :
  :
  S1 : ...;
  :
  :
  S2 : ...;
  :
  :

DEFINE
  -- characteristic function
  :
  :
  :

TRANS
  -- transition relation
  ( SXf = next (S1) ) &
  ( SXg = next (S2) )

-- fairness constraints
FAIRNESS !S1U1 | S1
  :
  :
  :
FAIRNESS !S2U2 | S2

-- new specification
SPEC !(S1 & BG true)

```

Translator output for SMV program

Result of translation for simple example:

```

MODULE main -- simple program
VAR a: boolean;
    b: boolean;
TRANS ( a & !b) -> next(! (a & !b))
TRANS ( a & b) -> next(a & !b)
TRANS (!a & b) -> next(!a & b)
TRANS (!a & !b) -> next(!a & b)

VAR EL_X_a_U_b : boolean;
DEFINE
  S_a := a;
  S_b := b;
  S_X_a_U_b := EL_X_a_U_b;
  S_a_U_b := S_b | (S_a & S_X_a_U_b);
  S_NOT_a_U_b := !S_a_U_b;

TRANS S_X_a_U_b = next(S_a_U_b)
FAIRNESS !S_a_U_b | b
SPEC !(S_NOT_a_U_b & EG true)

```

Experimental Results

- ▶ Distributed mutual exclusion (DME) circuit
 - ▶ Speed-independent token ring composed of identical cells
 - ▶ Each gate is modeled as a non-deterministic finite-state machine.
- ▶ Specifications
 1. (Safety) No two users are acknowledged simultaneously.
 2. (Liveness) All requests are eventually acknowledged.
- ▶ Results (time and space) : Comparison with CTL model checking
 - ▶ (Safety) Within 10% increase
 - ▶ (Liveness) Within 1.5-3 times increase (2 times for large circuits)

Experimental Results (Cont.)

#cell	#nodes		#time(sec)		trans.		#reachable states	
	CTL	LTL	CTL	LTL	CTL	LTL	CTL	LTL
3	11326	11362	17.9	20.5	2778	2781	6579	13158
4	13458	15357	47.5	49.4	4757	4760	75172	150344
5	22321	22348	100.5	104.4	6760	6763	802425	1.60e+06
6	25869	27318	182.3	193.6	8763	8766	8.21e+06	1.64e+07
7	28413	33310	326.4	329.3	10766	10769	8.17e+07	1.63e+08
8	44322	44369	509.2	526.3	12769	12772	7.97e+08	1.59e+09
9	49702	49755	794.0	794.8	14772	14775	7.65e+09	1.53e+10
10	55082	55141	1125.2	1362.7	16775	16778	7.30e+10	1.46e+11

Table: Safety specification for the DME circuit

#cell	#nodes		#time(sec)		trans.		#reachable states	
	CTL	LTL	CTL	LTL	CTL	LTL	CTL	LTL
3	12721	33040	42.6	1260	2778	3004	6579	26316
4	28941	72029	2553	6096	4757	4983	75172	300688
5	47346	120299	9623	21950	6760	6986	802425	3.20e+06
6	92080	183043	36995	66502	8763	8989	8.21e+06	3.28e+07
7	163867	263380	97807	191990	10766	10992	8.17e+07	3.27e+08

Table: Liveness specification for the DME circuit