





Interdomain routing control for FABRIC experiments with PEERING

Ítalo Cunha


Optimizing Intradomain Routes for a Service




Connecting FABRIC Experiments to the Internet




Connecting FABRIC Experiments to the Internet




Connecting FABRIC Experiments to the Internet




Connecting FABRIC Experiments to the Internet




Connecting FABRIC Experiments to the Internet




Control Announcements to Steer Traffic




Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service




Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service




Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service




Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service




Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service




Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service




Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service



Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service



Optimize Interdomain Routes for a Service




Rich Research Area

Knobs:

- BGP prepending
- BGP communities
- Selective announcements
- Subprefix announcements
- Superprefix announcements

Objectives for traffic engineering:

- Performance
- Static configurations
- Fast failover
- Capacity constraints



Rich Research Area

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- BGP prepending
- BGP communities
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Objectives for traffic engineering:

- Performance
- Static configurations
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Users

Other applications:

- Reliability
 - Detouring around failures
 - Avoiding congested paths
- Security
 - Prefix hijacks
 - Denial of service attacks
- Internet characterization
 - Topology discovery
 - Reverse engineering routing policies

-
-
-

What do we need to run interdomain routing experiments?


Running Traffic Engineering Experiments



Resources:

- AS number
- IP prefix

Running Traffic Engineering Experiments




Resources:

- AS number
- IP prefix

Infrastructure:

- Routers around the globe

Running Traffic Engineering Experiments




Resources:

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Running Traffic Engineering Experiments



Resources:

- AS number
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
- Routers around the globe
- Interconnections

Tooling:

- Control announcements
- Ensure safety


PEERING is a routing research testbed

Facilitates executing experiments on the Internet





Connecting to PEERING PoPs




..... BGP Session

 Physical Circuit


Connecting to PEERING PoPs




Connecting to PEERING PoPs




Connecting to PEERING PoPs




Connecting to PEERING PoPs




Connecting to PEERING PoPs



Connecting to PEERING PoPs




Connecting to PEERING PoPs



PEERING's Security Framework

Ensure safety

Running Traffic Engineering Experiments



Resources:

- AS number
- IP prefix

Infrastructure:

- Routers around the globe
- Interconnections

Tooling:

- Control announcements
- Ensure safety

BIZ & IT —

Russian-controlled telecom financial services' Internet

Visa, MasterCard,

DAN GOODIN - 4/27/2017, 4

BIZ & IT —

"Suspicious" event routes traffic for big-name sites through Russia

Google, Facebook, Apple

DAN GOODIN - 12/13/2017, 5:43 PM

THANKS, BGP. —

BGP event sends European mobile traffic through China Telecom for 2 hours

Improper leak to Chinese-government-owned telecom lasts up to two hours.

DAN GOODIN - 6/8/2019, 12:05 PM

BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL ATTACK —

Suspicious event hijacks Amazon traffic for 2 hours, steals cryptocurrency

Almost 1,300 addresses for Amazon Route 53 rerouted for two hours.

DAN GOODIN - 4/24/2018, 4:00 PM

PEERING's Security Framework




Experiment




Internet

PEERING's Security Framework



Interpose between experiment and Internet
to enforce security

PEERING's Security Framework




Announcements (control plane) and traffic (data plane) are intercepted and inspected.

Control Plane
→

Data Plane
→ 41

PEERING's Security Framework




Data plane enforcement limits IP source addresses to experiment allocations and traffic rate

Control Plane →

— — — — — Data Plane → 42

PEERING's Security Framework




Data plane enforcement limits IP source addresses to experiment allocations and traffic rate

Control Plane →

— — — — — Data Plane → 43

PEERING's Security Framework




Data plane enforcement limits IP source addresses to experiment allocations and traffic rate

Control Plane →

— — — — — Data Plane → 44

PEERING's Security Framework




Control plane enforcement checks prefixes and announcement properties

Control Plane →

— — — — — Data Plane → 45

PEERING's Security Framework




Control plane enforcement checks prefixes and announcement properties

Control Plane →

— — — — — Data Plane → 46

PEERING's Security Framework



Control plane enforcement checks prefixes
and announcement properties

Control Plane →

Data Plane → 47

Conclusion

You can control how your FABRIC experiment exchanges traffic with the Internet

Check out PEERING at <https://peering.ee.columbia.edu>