

CS:4330 Theory of Computation  
Spring 2018

**Computability Theory**  
Undecidability

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## Readings for this lecture

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Chapter 4 of [Sipser 1996], 3rd edition. Section 4.2.

# Computing as we know it is limited in a fundamental way

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- ▷ There are problems which are algorithmically unsolvable.
- ▷ We will cover several computationally unsolvable problems and how to prove unsolvability.
- ▷ We start with the halting problem.

# Halting problem of TMs

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- ▷ Whether an arbitrary TM will halt on an arbitrary input
- ▷ It is also the membership problem of TMs:

$$A_{\text{TM}} = \{ \langle M, w \rangle \mid M \text{ is a TM and } M \text{ accepts } w \}$$

- ▷ While  $A_{\text{DFA}}$  and  $A_{\text{CFG}}$  are decidable,  $A_{\text{TM}}$  **is not**.

# Undecidability of Halting Problem

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## Theorem

$A_{TM}$  is undecidable.

- ▷ Before we proceed to the proof, we first establish that  $A_{TM}$  is Turing-recognizable
- ▷ This proves that recognizers are more powerful than deciders
- ▷ Requiring that a TM halts on all inputs restricts its expressive power.

## A recognizer for $A_{\text{TM}}$

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The following TM  $U$  recognizes  $A_{\text{TM}}$

$U$  = “On input string  $\langle M, w \rangle$ , where  $M$  is a TM and  $w$  is a string:

1. Simulate  $M$  on input  $w$
2. If  $M$  ever enters its accept state, *accept*; if  $M$  ever enters its reject state, *reject*.”

$U$  is an *universal Turing machine*, which can simulate any other Turing machine from its description.

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## Halting

- ▷ Note that  $U$  is not a decider, since it possibly loops indefinitely.
- ▷ The name “halting problem” comes from the impossibility of  $U$  determining whether  $M$  ever halts.

# How to prove undecidability

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- ▷ The proof of undecidability of the TM membership problem uses Georg Cantor (1873) technique called *diagonalization*
- ▷ Cantor's problem was to measure the size of infinite sets
- ▷ The size of finite sets is measured by counting the number of their elements
- ▷ The size of infinite sets cannot be measured by counting their elements since this procedure does not halt

# Examples of infinite sets

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- ▷ The set of strings over  $\{0, 1\}$  is infinite
- ▷ So is the set  $\mathbb{N}$  of natural numbers<sup>1</sup>
- ▷ The set  $\mathbb{E}$  of all even natural numbers is also infinite
- ▷ How can we compare these sets?

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## Cantor's solution

- ▷ Two sets have the same size if their elements can be paired (i.e. you can establish a bijection, a one-to-one correspondence)
- ▷ Since this method does not rely on counting it serves both finite and infinite sets

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<sup>1</sup>Here we believe that 0 is a natural number.

# Correspondence

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For two sets  $A$  and  $B$  and a function  $f : A \rightarrow B$

- ▷  $f$  is *one-to-one* if it never maps two different elements of  $A$  into the same element of  $B$ , i.e.  $f$  is injective, i.e.  $f(a) \neq f(b)$  whenever  $a \neq b$
- ▷  $f$  is *onto* if it hits every element of  $B$ , i.e.  $f$  is surjective, i.e.  $\forall y \in B. \exists x \in A. f(x) = y$
- ▷  $f$  is called a *correspondence* if it is both *one-to-one* and *onto*

Two sets  $A$  and  $B$  have the same size if there is a correspondence  $f : A \rightarrow B$

## Example Correspondences

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- ▷ Let  $\mathbb{N}$  be the set of natural numbers and  $\mathbb{E}$  the set of even natural numbers
  
- ▷ Intuitively one may believe that  $\#(\mathbb{N}) > \#(\mathbb{E})$  since  $\mathbb{E} \subset \mathbb{N}$ . However, using Cantor's method we can show that  $\mathbb{N}$  and  $\mathbb{E}$  have the same size by constructing the correspondence  $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{E}$  defined by  $f(n) = 2n$

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### Definition

A set is *countable* if it is finite or it has the same size as  $\mathbb{N}$ .

# A complex correspondence

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Let  $\mathbb{Q}$  be the set of positive rational numbers, i.e.  $\mathbb{Q} = \left\{ \frac{m}{n} \mid m \in \mathbb{N}, n \in \mathbb{N}^+ \right\}$

- ▷ Intuitively,  $\mathbb{Q}$  seems to be much larger than  $\mathbb{N}$
- ▷ Yet we can show that these two sets have the same size by constructing a correspondence

## Correspondence $\mathbb{Q} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$

1. Put  $\mathbb{N}$  on two axes
2. Line  $i$  contains all rationals that have numerator  $i$ , i.e.  
 $\left\{ \frac{i}{j} \mid i \in \mathbb{N} \text{ fixed}, j \in \mathbb{N}^+ \right\}$
3. Column  $j$  contains all rationals that have denominator  $j$ , i.e.  
 $\left\{ \frac{i}{j} \mid i \in \mathbb{N}, j \in \mathbb{N}^+ \text{ fixed} \right\}$
4. Number  $\frac{i}{j}$  occurs in  $i$ -th row and  $j$ -th column

# Listing rational numbers

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- ▷ *Bad idea*: list first elements of a line or a column.  
Lines and columns are labeled by natural numbers, therefore this would never end.
- ▷ *Good idea* (by Cantor): use the diagonals.
  1. First diagonal contains  $\frac{0}{1}$
  2. Continue the list with the elements of the next diagonal skipping repetitions:  $\frac{1}{1}, \frac{2}{1}, \frac{1}{2}, \dots$
  3. Elements that may generate repetitions, such as  $\frac{i}{i}$ , which would generate a copy of  $\frac{1}{1}$ , or  $\frac{0}{i}$ , which would be a copy of  $\frac{0}{1}$

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## More infinite countable sets

- ▷  $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$
- ▷  $\mathbb{N}^k$ , for any  $k \in \mathbb{N}$
- ▷  $\Sigma^*$
- ▷ Any subset of a countable set is also countable

# Uncountable sets

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An infinite set for which no correspondence with  $\mathbb{N}$  can be established is denoted *uncountable*.

## Theorem

*The set of real numbers is uncountable.*

## Proof idea

We can show this using Cantor's diagonalization method.

## No correspondence exists between $\mathbb{N}$ and $\mathbb{R}$

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- ▷ Suppose that such a correspondence  $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  exists and deduce a contradiction showing that  $f$  fails to work properly.
- ▷ We construct an element  $x \in \mathbb{R}$  that cannot be the image of an  $n \in \mathbb{N}$
- ▷ We must show that  $x \neq f(n)$  for every  $n \in \mathbb{N}$

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## Building $x$

Construct  $x \in (0, 1)$  by the following procedure:

$$x = 0.d_0d_1d_2d_3d_4\dots$$

such that  $\forall i \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $d_i$  is a digit different from the  $i$ -th digit of  $f(i)$ .

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such that  $\forall i \in \mathbb{N}$ ,  $d_i$  is a digit different from the  $i$ -th digit of  $f(i)$ .

- ▷  $x$  is different from *all* real numbers in the image of  $f$  by at least one digit
- ▷ Therefore, since  $x \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}. x \neq f(n)$ , the function  $f$  is not surjective, so it cannot be a correspondence
- ▷ The “diagonalization” comes from using the diagonal of the table with entries  $(n, f(n))$ ,  $n \in \mathbb{N}$  to build  $x$ .

# Some languages are not Turing-recognizable

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## Set of all languages is uncountable

1. The set  $\mathcal{B}$  of all infinite binary strings is uncountable
2. There is a correspondence between the set of all languages  $\mathcal{L}$  and  $\mathcal{B}$

## Set of all TMs is countable

1.  $\Sigma^*$  is countable
2. Each TM  $M$  has an encoding  $\langle M \rangle$  into a string

- ▷ Since each Turing machine recognizes a single language and there are more languages than TMs, some languages are not recognized by any TM
- ▷ Such languages are not Turing recognizable

# Proving the Halting problem is undecidable

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We assume that  $A_{\text{TM}} = \{\langle M, w \rangle \mid M \text{ is a TM and } M \text{ accepts } w\}$  is decidable:

- ▷ Let  $H$  be a decider for  $A_{\text{TM}}$

$$H(\langle M, w \rangle) = \begin{cases} \textit{accept} & \text{if } M \text{ accepts } w \\ \textit{reject} & \text{if } M \text{ does not accept } w \end{cases}$$

- ▷ Let  $D$  be a TM that uses  $H$  as a subroutine: it calls  $H$  to determine how  $M$  behaves on the input  $\langle M \rangle$  and outputs the opposite.
- ▷  $D$  = “On input string  $\langle M \rangle$ , where  $M$  is a TM:
  1. Run  $H$  on input  $\langle M, \langle M \rangle \rangle$
  2. Output the opposite of what  $H$  outputs, i.e. if  $H$  accepts, *reject*; if  $H$  rejects, *accept*.”
- ▷ What about running  $D$  on  $\langle D \rangle$ ?

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- ▷ What about running  $D$  on  $\langle D \rangle$ ?

$$D(\langle D \rangle) = \begin{cases} \textit{accept} & \text{if } D \text{ does not accept } \langle D \rangle \\ \textit{reject} & \text{if } D \text{ accepts } \langle D \rangle \end{cases}$$

**$D$  cannot exist, so neither can  $H$ !**

## Where is the diagonalization?

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- ▷ The use of diagonalization can be seen if we construct a table of all Turing Machines  $M_0, \dots, M_n$  (rows) running on encoded Turing Machines  $\langle M_0 \rangle, \dots, \langle M_n \rangle$  (columns) as inputs:

Entries  $(i, j)$  are *accept* if  $M_i$  *accepts*  $\langle M_j \rangle$ , *reject* otherwise:  $H(\langle M_i, \langle M_j \rangle \rangle)$

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- ▷  $D$  computes the opposite of the diagonal entries, but on  $\langle D, \langle D \rangle \rangle$  it must be the opposite of itself.

# A Turing-unrecognizable language

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## Definition

A language is co-Turing-recognizable if it is the complement of a Turing-recognizable language.

## Theorem

*A language is decidable iff it is Turing-recognizable and co-Turing-recognizable.*

## Corollary

*For any undecidable language, either the language or its complement is not Turing-recognizable.*

## Corollary

$\overline{A_{TM}}$  is not Turing-recognizable.